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I. Introduction
Shanties, symbolizing student opposition to South African 
apartheid and the demand that United States universities divest 
from corporations doing business in South Africa, were the sit-ins 
of the 1980s. Silent but graphic, shanties challenged the estab­
lished order and attracted media attention. Sometimes, like sit-ins, 
the impact of shanties provoked state officials to demand their re­
moval. The resultant confrontations between protestors and offi­
cials both highlighted the demand for change and challenged the 
boundaries of first amendment law.
Occasionally a nonverbal symbol manages to capture the es­
sence of the meaning behind a movement. As Justice Jackson ob­
served, “Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communi­
cating ideas. The case of an emblem or flag to symbolize some 
system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to 
mind.”1 Symbolic speech enjoys constitutional protection. The case 
for such protection is stronger when the speech occurs in a public 
forum, an area dedicated to speech activities. Nevertheless, certain 
state interests can, if properly pursued, justify limits on protected 
speech.
This Article will examine the concepts of symbolic speech and 
the public forum—concepts that gained explicit legal recognition 
in the 1930s. In light of these concepts two cases involving shanties 
will be reviewed. While these cases occupy a small portion of first 
amendment history, their differing outcomes raise concern for
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speech rights, and the ability to bring important political and so­
cial issues to the public’s attention, as we move into the 1990s. The 
Article will then review a variety of university responses to shan­
ties, focusing on one state university’s speech regulations as a 
model for dealing with symbolic speech. This model assumes that 
speech rights are of paramount importance, and that they should 
be protected to the extent that university functions will permit.
II. Symbolic Speech
Draft card burning in opposition to the Vietnam war and sit- 
ins protesting racial discrimination enfleshed words that attempted 
to persuade a nation. Shanties pursue the same goal. When located 
on a state university campus, shanties do not necessarily raise the 
difficulty of trespass on private property as did the sit-in cases.2 
Trespass, however, is not the real issue. More important is the fact 
that a structure, albeit one of cardboard, plywood, and graffiti, may 
be symbolic speech.
Shanties were first found to constitute symbolic speech and, 
therefore to be protected from discretionary destruction in Univer­
sity of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson.3 The United 
States District Court for the District of Utah issued an injunction 
forbidding the removal of two shanties.4 The court held that the
2. In the early 1960s, the United States Supreme Court frequently found itself con­
fronted with sit-in cases but managed to avoid the issue of trespass on private property. The 
Maryland Court of Appeals, in Bell v. State, 227 Md. 302, 176 A.2d 771 (1962), rev’d and 
remanded, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), directly confronted that issue. “On principle, we think the 
right to speak freely and to make public protest does not import a right to invade or remain 
upon the property of private citizens, so long as private citizens retain the right to choose 
their guests or customers.” 176 A.2d at 772.
The United States Supreme Court, rather than directly confronting the issue, reversed 
on the basis of subsequently enacted state and local public accommodations legislation. See 
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); see also Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (dis­
missing sit-in conviction based on equal protection and state involvement in restaurant seg­
regation); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964)(dismissing sit-in conviction for in­
sufficiency of evidence); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1962)(dismissing sit-in 
conviction on equal protection grounds). See generally H. K alven , T he N egro  a nd  th e  
F ir st  A m en dm en t , 123-72 (1966)(discussing sit-in cases); L. T ribe , A m erican  C on stitu ­
tion al  L aw  § 18-3, at 1702 n.14 (2d ed. 1988)(briefly discussing sit-in cases).
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h), the Court gained the power to decide 
questions of public accommodations on a statutory basis. See Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294' (1964). Therefore, 
the rights of the owner of private property open to the public to exclude a speaker for 
reasons unrelated to race remains an open question.
3. 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Utah 1986). -
4. See id. at 1201.
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shanties were constitutionally protected symbolic speech, and thus 
could be regulated only by reasonable time, place, and manner 
rules promulgated and applied with content-neutrality.6
In so doing, District Judge Aldon Anderson connected the 
shanties with an honored line of cases recognizing that nonverbal 
symbols truly may speak louder than words. The symbol may mo­
tivate action with an immediacy and power that transcends verbal 
speech. Whether the Christian cross or the swastika, tea dumped 
into Boston’s harbor, the music of Bach, the soaring spires of a 
Gothic cathedral, a burning draft card, or our nation’s flag and our 
own salute, symbolic speech needs no words to convey meaning 
and compel action.
Beginning at least as early as 1931 with Stromberg v. Califor­
nia,6 when the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional 
a state regulation prohibiting the display of a red flag, a symbol of 
revolution, symbolic speech has been recognized and protected. In 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette'2 the Court 
barred the state from demanding that school children salute the 
flag. The Court held that nonverbal symbolic speech, like verbal 
speech, cannot be compelled.8 The Court found no conflict between 
the rights of those individuals choosing not to salute the flag and 
the rights of any other individual. “The sole conflict,” the Court 
noted, “ is between authority and rights of the individual.”9
Barnette established that a state cannot compel an individual 
to speak. Nor can the individual compel the state to speak. The 
Court found no compelled state speech in Spence v. Washington,10 
a flag desecration case. The defendant, protesting the Kent State 
killings and the Cambodian invasion, taped a peace sign to a 
United States flag and displayed it in his window. “There was no.
5. See id. at 1211. But see State v. Ybarra, 550 P.2d 763 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (holding 
physical structure is not symbolic speech). The Ybarra court found the defendants’ speaking 
and leafletting at Portland State University to be speech. The court said, however, that 
under the first amendment the erection of a structure (a tent) was not protected. See id. at 
766. This conclusion may have been compelled by the court’s finding that the Ybarra de­
fendants, by using a bullhorn, “greatly disrupted classes.” Id. at 764; see also Grayned v. 
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)(involving noise disturbance); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U.S. 77 (1949)(involving sound truck); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)(involving 
sound amplification).
6. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
7. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
8. See id. at 630.
9. Id', see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state cannot compel motorists 
to display “ Live Free or Die” motto on license plates).
10. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
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risk that appellant’s acts would mislead viewers into assuming that 
the Government endorsed his viewpoint. To the contrary, he was 
plainly and peacefully protesting that it did not.”11 Thus the state 
was not justified in prosecuting the desecration based on a “com­
pelled speech” or “unwilling endorser” rationale.12
Williams v. Eaton,13 was an unusual case in which the state’s 
concerns about being an unwilling endorser were held to support a 
restriction on symbolic speech. In Williams, the dismissal of fifteen 
black football players from the University of Wyoming football 
team was upheld.14 The players, protesting allegedly racist policies 
of Brigham Young University and the Mormon Church, had re­
fused to play a scheduled football game unless allowed to wear 
black armbands. The court held that the protest of the football 
players, in keeping with the state’s principle of complete neutral­
ity, could not be allowed.10 A key distinguishing factor from Wil­
liams and from the usual state unwilling endorser argument is ap­
parent. In most unwilling endorser cases the speakers are not 
asserting their views in connection with any state sponsored activ­
ity. In Williams, the state university sponsored and financed the 
football team.16 ,
The most compelling response to the unwilling endorser argu­
ment—indeed usually the only argument necessary—is that the 
university, as host to a multitude of conflicting ideas, cannot rea­
sonably be thought to endorse any one particular message, whether 
spoken or symbolic. Like the protestor in Spence, speakers who 
erect shanties do so not because the University agrees with their 
position, but precisely because it does not. The University of Utah 
raised the unwilling endorser argument in University of Utah Stu­
dents Against Apartheid, but without success.17
11. Id. at 414-15. ,
12. Id. at 415. .
13. 333 F, Supp. 107 (D. Wyo. 1971). This case was actually the third in a series of 
four published opinions. See Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Wyo. 1970), aff’d in 
part and remanded, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971), on remand, 333 F. Supp. 107 (D. Wyo, 
1971), aff’d, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972). ,
14. See Williams, 333 F. Supp. at 113.
15. See id. at 113-14.
16. The decision is not without its critics. Some argue that Williams was wrongly de­
cided because of the court’s emphasis on avoiding “hostile expression,” which is not a con­
stitutionally valid way to limit speech. See J. W eist a r t  & C. L ow ell , T he  L aw  of S ports  § 
1.12, at 30 (1979).
17. Following the decision in University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peter­
son, 649 F. Supp. 12Q0 (D. Utah, 1986), the University of Utah established a committee to 
draft time, place, and manner, regulations. In its new University Speech Policies, the Univer­
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The civil rights movement and opposition to the Vietnam War 
produced major changes in the law of symbolic speech. Nonverbal 
symbolic demonstrations were the incarnation of opposition to ra­
cial segregation. In Brown u. Louisiana,18 the Court reversed the 
breach of the peace convictions of five black individuals who as­
serted physical albeit silent opposition to segregated library facili­
ties. Although not decided strictly on speech grounds, the Court in 
Street v. New York19 reversed the conviction of a black man who, 
distraught over the shooting of civil rights leader James Meredith, 
burned his American flag.
Similarly, the burning draft card became a symbol of opposi­
tion to the Vietnam War. In United States v. O’Brien20 the Court 
found that burning a draft card was symbolic speech.21 But the 
Court also held that the government’s interest in efficient adminis­
tration of the Selective Service system was sufficiently compelling 
to justify the restriction on speech that resulted from making draft 
card destruction a criminal offense.22 “This Court has held that 
when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same 
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in 
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations 
on First Amendment freedoms.”23 The Court asserted that the law 
criminalizing the destruction of a draft card was aimed only at the 
“noncommunicative aspect” of the conduct.24 Although O’Brien 
has been widely criticized on this point,20 it established a standard
sity of Utah weakened future use of the compelled speech argument: “By virtue of regulat­
ing the exercise of free speech on the campus, the University does not sponsor or sanction 
the messages being stated or the methods of speech being used unless expressly stated oth­
erwise.” University Regulations, Ch. IX, University Speech Policies (May 15, 1987). See 
also infra notes 226-40 and accompanying text (discussing University of Utah speech 
policies).
18. 383 U.S, 131 (1966). The defendants had remained in the “white” library after 
being asked to leave. See id. at 136-37.
19. 394 U.S. 576 (1969). The defendant’s conviction under the flag desecration statute 
was reversed because the Court found a possibility that the defendant had been convicted 
for what he had said as he burned the flag. See id. at 581. The Court did not directly 
confront the issue whether a state could constitutionally prohibit flag desecration until 
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). Johnson is discussed infra, at notes 55-64 and 
accompanying text.
20. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
21. See id. at 376.
22. See id. at 377-80.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 381-82.
25. While the government’s interest in maintaining its draft cards may not have been 
nonexistent, it seems to have been nominal at best. Burning a draft card would not remove 
an individual’s record from the Selective Service computers. Even assuming a valid govern­
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that still helps to define the limits on government regulation of 
symbolic speech: .
[A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the 
constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an important 
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than 
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.26
A more sensitive approach to symbolic speech was taken in 
Spence v. Washington.27 In Spence, the Court declared a peace 
sign taped to the American flag to be protected symbolic speech.28 
The Court found that “the nature of appellant’s activity, combined 
with the factual context and environment in which it was under­
taken, lead to the conclusion that he engaged in a form of pro­
tected expression.”29 Spence set the standard for determining 
when conduct is to be treated as speech: “An intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and in the surrounding cir­
cumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be un­
derstood by those who viewed it.”30 Both of these criteria are asso­
ciated with shanties.31
Spence is important for two other reasons. First, in rejecting
mental interest, that interest was still insufficient to justify suppressing speech. “The Court 
was content to demonstrate that the government’s interest in preventing the destruction of 
draft cards is real, that is, not imaginary or nonexistent. But an interest may well be real 
without being important enough to sustain an abridgment of speech.” Alfange, Free Speech 
and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. Ct. R ev . 1, 23. Indeed, the 
fact that destroying a draft card was illegal made its burning a potent symbol. “With the 
passage of the Rivers amendment [making illegal the destruction of a draft card], Congress 
had thrown down the gauntlet and provided an invitation to martyrdom certain to be irre­
sistible to those who felt the need to make a personal sacrifice for the cause of conscience.” 
Id. at 6.
It appears that the Court considered not so much the government’s interest in a piece 
of paper, but rather public destruction of what the paper represented. It was precisely the 
power of the act that the government feared; it was the power of symbolic speech that 
O’Brien attempted to stifle. The government was not concerned with its piece of paper, but 
rather with the message conveyed by the paper’s destruction. It feared the content of the 
message.
26. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
27. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
28. See id. at 410.
. 29. Id. at 409-10.
30. Id. at 410-11.
31. “The structures themselves have few, if any, nonexpressive benefits . . . .  Further, 
on all outside walls of the shanties, words and drawings serve to explain the anti-apartheid/ 
pro-divestiture message of the protestors.” University of Utah Students Against Apartheid 
v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (D. Utah 1986).
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the “captive audience” argument, the Court stated: “Moreover, ap­
pellant did not impose his ideas upon a captive audience. Anyone 
who might have been offended could easily have avoided the dis­
play.”32 This is also true in the case of shanties.33 Second, Spence 
reaffirmed that the “offensiveness” of speech does not justify its 
suppression: “It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the 
public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because 
the ideas are themselves offensive, to some of their hearers.”34 
Three years before Spence, in Cohen v. California,36 the Court 
reversed the breach of the peace conviction of an individual who 
had worn a jacket, in the county courthouse, with a common 
though offensive epithet emblazoned on it. In addition to noting 
that those offended had the option of “averting their eyes,”36 the 
Court rejected the “fighting words” argument, finding that the 
epithet was not “directed to the person of the hearer.”37
Cohen is applicable to the shanties question in that the Uni­
versity of Utah relied on the hostile reaction to the shanties to jus­
tify their removal.38 The University argued that the shanties were 
“intentionally ugly and unaesthetic,” and “an imposition on a cap­
tive audience.”38 As the Court noted in Cohen, however, “ [s]urely 
the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where
32. Spence, 418 U.S. at 412 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). In Cohen, 
the Court wrote that those offended by the visual display “could effectively avoid further 
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.” Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
33. The University of Utah asserted a captive audience argument in its attempt to 
remove the shanties. See Defendants’ Memorandum at 16-17, University of Utah Students 
Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Utah 1986)(No. 86C-06884).
34. Spence, 418 U.S. at 412 (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, was even more emphatic on this point. He com­
mended an Iowa decision involving a fact situation similar to that in Spence:
Someone in Newton might be so intemperate as to disrupt the peace because of this 
display. But if absolute assurance of tranquility is required, we may as well forget 
about free speech. Under such a requirement, the only “free” speech would consist of 
platitudes. That kind of speech does not need constitutional protection.
Id. at 416 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Kool, 212 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 1973)).
35. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing “averting their eyes” 
argument).
37. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)); see 
also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (discussing regulation of fighting 
words).
38. The shanties twice were destroyed in nighttime attacks. On other occasions, a 
shanty was set afire and a Molotov cocktail was thrown near the shanties. See University of 
Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (D. Utah 1986).
39. Defendant’s Memorandum at 17, University of Utah Students Against Apartheid 
v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1700 (D. Utah 1986) (No. 86C-06884).
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it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us.”40 
Cohen thus rejected grammatical palatability. Similarly, visual pal- 
atability should not be a factor in the regulation of symbolic 
speech. Indeed, the “offensive” appearance of shanties furthered 
the protestors’ goal of illustrating the offensiveness of apartheid.
Tinker v. Des Moines School District41 combined an educa­
tional setting, symbolic speech, and the anti-war movement. Plain­
tiffs had been suspended from school for wearing black armbands 
in protest of the Vietnam War.42 The Court held that “First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students.”43
The University of Utah attempted to justify removal of the 
shanties on the basis of concern for personal safety and the eco­
nomic costs of preserving safety and property.44 These are often 
legitimate concerns, subject to protection through reasonable time, 
place, and manner regulations.45 The Court in Tinker, however, 
noted that such concerns do not always justify restricting speech:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur­
bance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. 
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any 
variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word 
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates 
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a 
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk.46
By recognizing and protecting symbolic speech, Spence, Cohen 
and Tinker furthered the expressive rights of individuals. Unfortu­
nately, the current trend in symbolic speech law appears to be 
based more upon O'Brien and the state’s desire for authority. 
There has been a shift away from protecting activities as speech, 
and toward protecting government interests asserted in limiting
40. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
41. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). ’
42. See id. at 504.
43. Id. at 506. But see Guzick v. Drebus, 305 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (distin­
guished from Tinker by school board’s showing that regulation prohibiting wearing of but­
tons was necessary to maintain discipline), aff’d, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 
401 U.S. 948 (1971).
44. See University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 
1200, 1202 (D. Utah 1986).
45. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (regu­
lations forbidding tent city demonstration except in designated camping areas were 
reasonable).
46. 393 U.S. at 508.
HeinOnline -- 1990 Utah L. Rev. 510 1990
No. 3] SYMBOLIC SPEECH 511
symbolic speech. An example of this trend is Clark v. Community 
for Creative Non-Violence.4,7 In Clark, the Court assumed, without 
deciding, that sleeping in “Reaganville,”48 a small tent city estab­
lished in Lafayette Park in Washington, D.C., to demonstrate the 
plight of the homeless, was symbolic speech.49 The Court then up­
held as reasonable National Park Service regulations forbidding 
camping except in designated areas,60 finding that the regulations 
met the O’Brien standard.61 .
Clark is representative of a trend that the Court has come to 
recognize a wide variety of symbolic conduct as speech, yet has up­
held as reasonable the regulation or even prohibition of that 
speech. This trend has its roots in the O’Brien and Spence deci­
sions. Spence provides a standard generous to the actor for defin­
ing when conduct is speech, but O’Brien provides a standard gen­
erous to the government for defining when regulation of symbolic 
conduct, even though speech, is justified. In Clark, the Court paid 
homage to its decision in Spence, noting: “It is also true that a 
message may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be com­
municative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood 
by the viewer to be communicative.”62 Taking back what it had 
just given, however, the Court then applied the O’Brien standard: 
“Symbolic expression of this kind may be forbidden or regulated if 
the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regula­
tion is narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental inter­
est, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
speech.”63 .
The Clark Court’s language is in part a paraphrase of the 
O’Brien standard. New to the formula, however, is the italicized 
language. This language indicates either an application of O’Brien 
even less protective of symbolic speech or a modification of the 
O’Brien standard toward that same end. This reformulated test
47. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
48. The tent city is named only in the dissent. See id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 293. The dissent criticized what it perceived as the majority’s evasive­
ness in not deciding that such activity is, or is not, speech. See id. at 301-02 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence, stated that sleep is conduct, not 
speech; “conduct that interferes with the rights of others to use Lafayette Park for the 
purposes for which it was created.” Id. at 300 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
50. See id. at 294.
51. See id. at 298. There is some change in the words of the standard from the original 
O’Brien statement. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (O’Brien, standard). Cf. infra 
note 53 and accompanying text (Clark standard).
52. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
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could be applied to give symbolic speech virtually no protection; 
almost any form of conduct may be regulated. And the test also 
invites only cursory scrutiny of the governmental interest asserted 
in the restriction of speech.64
The recent weakening of symbolic speech rights is evident 
even in cases where such speech has been protected against gov­
ernment regulation. One of the most notorious symbolic speech 
cases of the 1980s was Texas v. Johnson.55 In Johnson, the Court 
upheld the reversal of the conviction for flag desecration of a pro­
testor who burned an American flag during the 1984 Republican 
National Convention in Dallas.66 Applying Spence, the Court eas­
ily found the flag burning to be an expressive act.57 Because the 
desecration statute as applied was aimed at the expressive impact 
of flag burning,68 it was related to the suppression of speech, and 
thus outside the O'Brien test.59 Furthermore, because Texas had 
other laws in place to deal with breaches of the peace, the statute 
was not necessary to prevent possible violent reactions to flag 
burning.60 Finally, the Court found that Texas’ asserted interest in 
“preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national 
unity”61 was insufficiently compelling to support the conviction.62
Although Johnson was correctly decided, the decision cannot 
be considered heartening for supporters of symbolic speech rights.
54. See Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the Aes­
thetic State Interest, the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 H astin gs L.J. 439, 496 (1986)(“The 
Court presently gives extreme deference to the government’s asserted purposes, while main­
taining that it is using a significantly higher standard.”) (footnote omitted).
55. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
56. See id. at 2538-48.
57. See id. at 2540.
58. The statute prohibited “defac[ing], damaging], or otherwise physically mis- 
treat[ing]” a flag or other “ venerated object” “ in a way that the actor knows will seriously 
offend one or more persons likely to discover his action.” Id. at 2537 n.l (quoting T e x . 
P enal  C ode  Ann. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989)).
59. See id. at 2542; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (setting forth the 
O’Brien test).
60. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 2548. The Johnson opinion did not use the term “ compelling,” but did 
apply the “most exacting scrutiny” demanded in Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
Johnson, 109 S, Ct. at 2543-44. In Boos, the Court struck down a Washington, D.C. ordi­
nance prohibiting demonstrations against foreign governments within 500 feet of their em­
bassies. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 331-33. Noting that the ordinance was “a content-based re­
striction on political speech in a public forum”  the Court, through Justice O’Connor, held 
that to be sustained, the ordinance must be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest 
and [be] narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Perry 
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
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The decision was five to four, with one majority Justice “ex­
press [ing] distaste in the result.”63 Additionally, the minority Jus­
tices made emotional appeals for the creation of a special excep­
tion to symbolic speech law when the American flag is involved.64 
The willingness of four Justices to create exceptions to symbolic 
speech law precisely because of the “emotive impact” of a certain 
form of speech is cause for concern.
As a profoundly potent form of communication, nonverbal 
symbolic speech should be protected as strongly as more tradi­
tional forms of speech. No reason exists to do otherwise as long as 
the physical presence of the symbol does not constitute a crime 
against another or a trespass.65 Absent such circumstances, a dis­
tinction between “speech” and “conduct” makes no sense. Verbal 
speech itself, after all, merely symbolizes deeper, inarticulate 
meanings that we approach awkwardly with words.
Protection afforded symbol, verbal or physical, should be de­
termined by its subject matter: obscenity, commercial speech, 
“fighting words,” and libel or slander are properly unprotected or 
protected at minimal levels, whether the speech is verbal or non­
verbal. Political, religious, or aesthetic messages, absent crime or 
trespass, deserve maximum protection, regardless of the mode of 
expression.
Government interests, even if “unrelated to speech,” should be 
strictly scrutinized where political speech is concerned. Cases like 
O’Brien, Clark and those involving shanties may well have impli­
cated government interests unrelated to speech. More critically, 
however, they highlight dissatisfaction with government policies. 
The use of nonverbal symbolism commanded attention to these is­
sues. The denial of the power of such commands, through the gov­
ernment’s invocation of “nonspeech interests,” should be allowed 
only on a showing that such interests are themselves of critical so­
63. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and O’Connor, dismissed John­
son’s flag burning as “the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar.” Id. at 2553 (Rehn­
quist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stevens added that the “logical application” of the Court’s 
symbolic speech precedents is inappropriate because of the “ intangible dimension” of 
speech involved in desecration of the flag. Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. In Texas v. Johnson, the demonstration included theft and spray-painting build­
ings, which occurred before the flag-burning. See id. at 2536. Strangely, no criminal action 
was taken against the tangible harm done. See id. Rather, the state took action only when 
onlookers became “seriously offended by the flag-burning.” Id. at 2537. Prosecuting some­
one for communicative acts is bad; but it is worse when the prosecution is carried out, as a 
substitute for the prosecution of acts which truly invade the rights of others, as it appar­
ently was in Johnson.
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cietal importance.
III. T h e  P u b lic  Forum
The placement of shanties on a natural, although limited, pub­
lic forum strengthens their claim to protection. Streets and parks,68 
libraries,67 state capitol grounds,68 the mayor’s residence69 and 
courthouses70— places where speech and debate naturally oc­
cur— have been held to be less susceptible to the regulation of 
speech.71 The university is a citadel of free expression, and is like­
wise a place where speech, verbal or nonverbal, deserves maximum 
protection.
The foundation of today’s law on the public forum was laid in 
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,72 in Justice Rob­
erts’ famous dictum:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have im­
memorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out 
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use 
of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part 
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.73
In the 1960s, the civil rights movement,74 and later the anti­
war movement,76 challenged the boundaries of the public forum.76
66. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
67. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
68. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
69. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. I l l  (1969).
70. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
71. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S up. Ct. ' 
R ev. 1. Another commentator, drawing on cases subsequent to Kalven’s article, suggests that 
the Court employs two different tests to determine whether a particular locale is a public 
forum. “One test is whether the property is suitable for public speech use. The other is 
whether government has assigned the property for public speech use.” Cass, First Amend­
ment Access to Government Facilities, 65 Va. L. R ev . 1287, 1305 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
72. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
73. Id. at 515. At least one commentator believes that Justice Roberts’ emphasis on 
streets and parks, and the tradition of speech therein, led to today’s distinction between the 
traditional public forum and the nontraditional or nonpublic forum. See Note, The Public 
Forum and the First Amendment: The Puzzle of the Podium, 19 N ew  E n g . L. R ev. 619, 
627-28 (1983-84).
74. See Kalven, supra note 71, at 2-3; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966)(li- 
brary); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (state capitol grounds). But see Ad- 
derley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)(jail grounds not a public forum).
75. The antiwar movement played an important role in the area of symbolic speech. 
See supra notes 10-11, 20-30 and accompanying text.
76. Public forum status has been extended to municipal bus terminals, see Wolin v.
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While it is not always easy to define exactly what is a public forum, 
the Court had little difficulty deciding that a jail was not a public 
forum in Adderley v. Florida.77 Justice Black distinguished Ed­
wards v. South Carolina,18 in which the Court had held a state 
capitol grounds to be a public forum: “In Edwards, the demonstra­
tors went to the South Carolina State Capitol grounds to protest. 
In this case they went to the jail. Traditionally, state capitol 
grounds are open to the public. Jails, built for security purposes, 
are not.”79
Access to a particular forum will depend on its classification. 
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Associ­
ation,80 the Court established three classifications. The traditional, 
or “quintessential,” public forum offers the speaker the most pro­
tection. “In places which by long tradition or by government fiat 
have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State 
to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”81 Streets 
and parks fall within that classification. A government cannot close 
a quintessential public forum to all communication; nor may it reg­
ulate the forum with regard to the content of the speech without 
showing that a compelling state interest exists, and that the regu­
lation is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.82 The state may, 
however, enforce content-neutral regulations pertaining to time, 
place, and manner of the speech.83 Those regulations also must be 
narrowly drawn to serve a “significant” government interest and 
must leave open alternative channels of communication.84
The second type of public forum is “public property which the 
State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive 
activity.”86 A state which has created such a forum need not main­
tain it indefinitely. As long as a forum is maintained, however, 
speech restrictions in the forum must meet the same standards as 
they would in a quintessential public forum: “Reasonable time, 
place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based
Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968), and railway 
stations, In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
77. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
78. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
79. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 41.
80. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
81. Id. at 45.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 47 n.6 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965)).
84. See id.
85. Id.
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prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling 
state interest.”86
The third type, the nonpublic or private forum, is more easily 
regulated or even entirely closed to speech. This category includes 
jails, and more recently, the Nevada Nuclear Weapons Test Site.87 
“Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum 
for public communication is governed by different standards. We 
have recognized that the ‘First Amendment does not guarantee ac­
cess to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the 
government.’ ”88 The state may reserve a forum for a particular 
use, but the regulation must be reasonable “and not an effort to 
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the 
speaker’s view.”89
The above language on the nonpublic forum suggests the 
Court’s willingness to give at least some protection to the speaker 
using it. But Adderley made intended use of the property para­
mount— a consideration that survives to this day. “ [T]he State, no 
less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the
86. Id. at 46. .
87. See Hale v. Department of Energy, 806 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1986). The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the road leading up to the gates of 
the Nevada Nuclear Weapons Test Site was a nonpublic forum. See id. at 916. The Depart­
ment of Energy, therefore, had “the right to preserve the property under its control for its 
lawfully dedicated purpose.” Id. at 915. The court relied on the existence of alternative 
channels of communication, finding, “ [tjhe First Amendment does not demand unrestricted 
access to a nonpublic forum merely because use of that forum may be the most efficient 
means of delivering the speaker’s message.” Id. at 917 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985)).
Reliance on dedicated use and alternative fora is misplaced, and even calls into ques­
tion the content neutrality of the Department of Energy’s application of its regulations. In 
an era of electronic media, the image of demonstrators at the gate to the Nevada Nuclear 
Weapons Test Site will be much more memorable and effective than a shot of the same 
demonstrators in a barren desert just two or three miles from the gate. The Hale court 
rejected appellants’ reliance on precedent limiting officials’ discretion, saying that the 
United States Supreme Court has “never applied [that] kind of analysis to regulations re­
stricting access to government property that was not a public forum.” Hale, 806 F.2d at 917 
(citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)(striking down authority of 
city commissioners to deny parade permits); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 
(1938) (striking down law forbidding distribution of any literature without written permis­
sion of the city manager)). Yet, revealing its uncertainty, the Hale court retreated from that 
approach. It found that the appellants had made "no claim that the regulations were ap­
plied other than in a content-neutral manner.” Hale, 806 F.2d at 917.
Perhaps the Hale court and the Department of Energy truly did fear disruption. If so, 
it is likely that the disruption they feared was not that caused by the physical presence of 
the demonstrators, but rather by the political echoes of the speakers’ message.
88. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 37, 46 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Coun­
cil of Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)).
89. Id.
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property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated.”90
Cases involving a nonquintessential forum generally focus, as 
did Adderley, on whether a restriction on time, place, or manner is 
reasonable. The intended use of the location at issue is central to 
such a determination. In Grayned v. City of Rockford,91 the Court 
upheld an ordinance prohibiting demonstrations near the city’s 
schools. The ordinance was “a statute written specifically for the 
school context, where the prohibited disturbances are easily mea­
sured by their impact on the normal activities of the school.”92 
Similarly, in Greer v. Spock9Z the Court denied a political candi­
date the right to speak at a military base. The majority empha­
sized that the purpose of Fort Dix was to train soldiers; it was not, 
therefore, a public forum.94
In contrast, the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District95 used language indicating that, even 
when focusing on intentional use, a university could not prevail in 
an attempt to remove shanties from its campus. “The principal use 
to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students 
during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activi­
ties. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among 
the students.”96 In other words, if the intended use of public prop­
erty includes communication, speech restrictions on that property 
are likely to be carefully scrutinized.
In Widmar v. Vincent97 the Court suggested that a public uni­
versity, when open for general use by student groups, is a public 
forum, at least for its students and faculty. “Through its policy of 
accommodating their meetings, the University has created a forum 
generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the Uni­
versity has assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and
90. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
91. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
92. Id. at 112.
93. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
94. See id. at 838.
95. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
96. Id. at 512. The Court cited Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. 
Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967), for the proposition that a school is not like a jail enclosure (as in 
Adderley). See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 n,6. The Tinker Court found that a school “ is a 
public place, and its dedication to specific uses does not imply that the constitutional rights 
of persons entitled to be there are to be gauged as if the premises were purely private prop­
erty.” Id. This suggests a narrow reading of the dedicated use test, at least when applied to 
public educational facilities.
97. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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exclusions under applicable constitutional norms.”98 The Widmar 
Court found that the defendant university’s refusal to grant stu­
dent religious groups the same access to the forum provided to sec­
ular groups was a content-based exclusion.99 This violated “the 
fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be 
content-neutral. ”100
Taken together, Tinker and Widmar indicate that, to be sus­
tainable, speech restrictions on a university campus must meet the 
strict standards applied to quintessential and state-created public 
forums. Even if a university is considered a nonpublic forum, its 
primary intended use is the communication of ideas. Communica­
tion occurs both specifically in the classroom and generally on the 
campus. Therefore, content-based speech limits must be narrowly 
drawn to serve a compelling state interest and time, place, and 
manner limits must be narrowly drawn to meet a significant state 
interest.
A “significant” interest should be defined as one that clearly 
outweighs the value of the type of speech involved. For example, if 
the speech is political in nature, a much stronger justification for 
limits must apply than for limits on commercial speech. Such justi­
fication would not necessarily have to be “compelling,” but cer­
tainly close to it.
Shanties, like the armbands in Tinker, communicate ideas on 
political and social issues. Therefore, even a content-neutral time, 
place, and manner restriction on the use of shanties must pass rig­
orous scrutiny. This not only preserves the rights of the protestors, 
but also promotes the function of universities as centers for unin­
hibited dialogue on key social issues.
Speech restrictions in the university setting have strong justi­
fication when one speaker’s communication interferes with that of 
another, and a choice must be made concerning whose speech
98. Id. at 267. The Court stopped short of proclaiming a campus to be any type of 
public forum. It began with the statement that “ [t]his Court has recognized that the campus 
of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a 
public forum.” Id. at 267 n.5. Then, considering “the special characteristics of the school 
environment,” the Court concluded:
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks 
or even municipal theaters. A university’s mission is education, and decisions of this 
Court have never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations 
compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not 
held . . . that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.
Id. at 268 n.5.
99. See id. at 269-70.
100. Id. at 277.
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rights take priority. As in Grayned, it is appropriate to give prior­
ity to classroom communication over that outside of class. Other 
university-sponsored events such as graduation, athletic and artis­
tic exhibitions can also take priority. Justifications for speech re­
strictions on campus should be examined in light of their relation 
to such “core” university functions: certainly campus access, travel, 
and safety are closely related. As this relation becomes attenuated, 
however, the case for speech restrictions on campus weakens.
Given sufficient justification, time, place, and manner restric­
tions, free of content regulation, are appropriate even in a public 
forum, including a university. Shanties, although protected speech, 
carry no more right to remain in perpetuity than any other 
speaker. Yet a difference exists. A parade blocks the normal use of 
the street for other more customary forms of traffic. A speaker at 
the podium prevents another speaker’s presence. Shanties may or 
may not do the same. In most cases, another symbol or verbal 
speaker is not waiting to displace the shanty. Absent direct compe­
tition for use of the forum, justification for the removal of shanties 
and other political symbols must be powerful to be sustained.
For universities and other public fora, shanties pose significant 
problems in the threat of violence and the consequent necessity of 
protection, insurance coverage and upkeep of the grounds.101 This 
is where time, place, and manner regulations come into play. In 
developing regulations to deal with these problems, universities 
must keep in mind a line of cases in which a powerful trend is 
apparent. The enormous movement from Feiner v. New York102 to
101. The defendants in University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 
claimed that the cost of providing security for the shanties justified their removal. Affidavit 
of Chase Peterson (University of Utah President) at 3, University of Utah Students Against 
Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Utah 1986) (No. 86C-06884). Up to the time 
the plaintiffs filed suit to block removal of the shanties, the cost of security totaled approxi­
mately $5000. Salt Lake Tribune, Sept. 19, 1986 at A10, col.5. The University paid more 
than four times that amount to counsel for the Students Against Apartheid, the prevailing 
party in the action. See id. Apparently no attempt was made to estimate the value of the 
legal services provided to the University by the Utah Attorney General. It seems that it is 
often more expensive to fight speech than to protect it.
102. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). The Feiner Court upheld the breach of the peace conviction 
of a speaker who refused to leave the podium despite the'requests of a police officer who was 
concerned with the “hostile audience.” See id. at 321. Feiner was of no help to the Univer­
sity of Utah in University of Utah Students against Apartheid, however, because in Feiner 
the Court found that the defendant was inciting the crowd to riot. According to the Court:
It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppres­
sion of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the speaker passes the 
bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they are power­
less to prevent a breach of the peace.
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Edwards v. South Carolina103 and National Socialist Party of 
America v. Village of Skokie104 has limited what the state may do 
to protect the peace where the exercise of speech rights is involved. 
The state usually must protect the speaker and the community 
against the violence of the hostile crowd by means other than cur­
tailing the speech.
In Feiner, decided in 1951, police, fearing an angry crowd, re­
moved a speaker from his soapbox.105 The speaker’s breach of 
peace conviction was upheld by the Court.106 By 1963, our law had 
indeed come a long way. In Edwards, civil rights demonstrations 
on a street outside a courthouse were protected, even though a 
large and hostile crowd had gathered.107 The Edwards court ad­
monished police to protect the demonstrators by restraining the 
crowd, not by silencing the speaker.108 In Skokie, decided in 1977, 
state officials faced the seemingly impossible task of maintaining 
public safety in an extremely hostile Jewish community and pro­
tecting the lives of the demonstrators, American Nazis, without 
curtailing the speakers’ rights.109 Yet, even there, the Court refused 
to allow the state to preserve public safety by silencing the 
speaker.110 Indeed, a hostile audience often indicates effective, 
powerful speech rather than “nonspeech,” or some similar label 
used to deny protection:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is 
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it 
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions 
as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provoca­
tive and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions 
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of 
an idea.111
Id. at 321. Although there were several attempts to destroy the shanties, the University did 
not allege that the speakers were inciting their audience to riot.
103. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
104. 432 U.S. 43 (1977); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 
439 U.S. 916 (1978). Collin was one in a series of cases in which the town of Skokie, Illinois 
tried to prevent the American Nazi Party from marching in their community. Although 
Skokie was unsuccessful in the courts, the American Nazi Party, eventually chose not to 
stage the march.
105. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 318. '
106. See id. at 321.
107. See Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237-38.
108. See id. at 236-37.
109. See Skokie, 432 U.S. at 43-44.
110. See id.
111. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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Speech, as in Skokie, may be offensive; the very presence of 
Nazi speakers in a Jewish suburb can be offensive. To the potential 
listener, the speakers in Skokie symbolized hatred and inhuman­
ity; the speakers symbolized the Holocaust itself. But decisions up­
holding speech rights in those places where speech is highly valued, 
however offensive the speaker, however fraught with danger, 
demonstrate our commitment to first amendment principles. This 
commitment should be at its strongest in our public universi­
ties— institutions dedicated to the robust exchange of ideas.
IV. S h a n t ie s  in  t h e  C o u r t s
Litigation involving shanties on public university campuses 
represents a unique convergence of first amendment principles in­
volving symbolic speech and the public forum. Proper application 
of both concepts is necessary to provide adequate protection to 
first amendment rights. In University of Utah Students Against 
Apartheid the court applied these concepts properly. Subsequent 
cases arising from shanty demonstrations on the campus of the 
University of Virginia, however, did not.
A. The University of Utah Students Against Apartheid
Decision
The University of Utah, in its attempt to force removal of the 
shanties, relied primarily on pragmatic concerns: the cost of pro­
tecting the shanties and the potential tort liability from reaction to 
the shanties.112 Plaintiffs claimed that they had offered to provide 
their own insurance and security, but the University of .Utah dis­
puted that claim.113
Judge Anderson of the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah concluded that the shanties were symbolic speech 
under Spence v. Washington:114 there was intent to convey a mes­
112. Individuals unsympathetic to the message of the shanties attacked the structures 
several times. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Judge Anderson stated:
On two occasions part or all of the shanties were destroyed in nighttime attacks. On 
another occasion one shanty was set on fire. On a final occasion a Molotov Cocktail 
was thrown in the vicinity of the shanties. Although no injuries were sustained in 
these attacks, the university was forced to increase police protection of the shanties 
and increased the university’s estimated potential liability.
University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (D. 
Utah 1986).
113. See id.
114. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). See also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discuss­
ing Spence).
HeinOnline -- 1990 Utah L. Rev. 521 1990
522 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1990: 503
sage, and viewer understanding was likely.116 Indeed, Judge Ander­
son found it “hard to imagine a more effective transmission of a 
message.”116
The court then explored the limits of symbolic speech, dis­
cussing several cases in which a particular activity had been held 
not to be symbolic speech.117 Distinguishing cases holding certain 
conduct unprotected, Judge Anderson found that the conduct at 
issue in those cases “frequently occur[s] for noncommunicative 
reasons and thus blur[s] any message intended to be conveyed.”118 
Sleep,119 as in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, is 
such an activity; it is a gross understatement to say that it fre­
quently occurs for noncommunicative reasons. The problem, there­
fore, becomes one of convincing a court that the conduct is in­
tended to convey a “particularized message.”120
The University of Utah Students Against Apartheid court 
noted that the shanties had “few, if any, nonexpressive bene­
fits.”121 The “likely viewer understanding” element of the Spence 
test further eased the problem of proving communicative intent.122 
Moreover, the deliberate ugliness of the shanties was found to 
serve an “emotive function,” capturing media attention and the 
public eye.123 “Media attention is a strong indication of observer
115. See University of Utah Students Against Apartheid, 649 F. Supp. at 1204-05 
(footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 1205.
117. See id. at 1205-07. Among the cases where a particular activity has been held not 
to be symbolic speech is DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 616 F. Supp. 971, 979 (S.D. Fla.
1985), rev’d, 812 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1987)(running without a shirt involved “ neither pure 
speech nor the type of conduct akin to pure speech that would constitute symbolic speech”).
118. University of Utah Students Against Apartheid, 649 F. Supp. at 1207.
119. Although its status as protected speech is uncertain, several decisions of the 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals’ for the District of Columbia have held sleep to be 
protected speech. See Community for Creative Nonviolence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)(en banc), rev’d, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); United States v. Abney, 534 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 
1976). In Clark, the United States Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the sleep 
at issue was speech. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984); supra note 49 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Magid, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 C olum . 
L. R ev . 467, 504 (1984)(“The difficult task lies in finding a way to distinguish expressive and 
nonexpressive instances of the same act.”).
121. University of Utah Students Against Apartheid, 649 F. Supp. at 1204.
122. See id. at 1205.
123. See id.; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen, the Court 
declared that it could not “sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the 
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function 
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall mes­
sage sought to be communicated.” Id. at 26.
HeinOnline -- 1990 Utah L. Rev. 522 1990
No. 3] SYMBOLIC SPEECH 523
understanding because it highlights the communicative nature of 
the very form of conduct undertaken.”124
Judge Anderson then turned to the character of the university 
as a public forum. He began with the position that access to public 
property is not an absolute right: “ ‘Nothing in the Constitution 
requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to 
exercise their right to free speech on every type of government 
property.’ ”125 The University of Utah campus, however, was found 
to be a limited public forum under Perry,126 as “ ‘public property 
which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for 
expressive activity.’ ”m  Supporting this conclusion is the line of 
cases addressing the importance of communication in the educa­
tional context.128 In one of those decisions, Healy v. James,129 the 
Court rejected the view that, “because of the acknowledged need 
for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less 
force on college campuses than in the community at large.”130 
In establishing the University of Utah as “a limited public fo­
rum,” the court looked to the University of Utah’s Student Bill of 
Rights.131 The Student Bill of Rights guarantees students “the 
right to freedom of speech and assembly without prior restraint or 
censorship, subject only to clearly stated reasonable and nondis- 
criminatory rules and regulations regarding time, place, and man­
ner.”132 Noting that the University of Utah had granted permits to 
other student groups, as well as to the plaintiffs, the court found 
sufficient evidence indicating that the campus was available to stu­
dents as a public forum.133
The court did not decide, however, “to what extent permits 
can be required by the university for various free speech activi­
124. 649 F, Supp. at 1205 n.10.
125. Id. at 1208 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 799-800 (1985)).
126. See id. at 1209.
127. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)). .
128. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding university to be a lim­
ited public forum for students).
129. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
130. Id. at 180. Indeed, “ [t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is no­
where more vital than in the community of American schools.” Id. (citation omitted).
131. University of Utah Students Against Apartheid, 649 F. Supp. at 1209.
132. Id. at 1209 (quoting University Regulations, Ch. X, Student Code, art. II, § 2.02 
(Jan. 13, 1981)).
133. See id. at 1209 & n.17.
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ties.”134 The court did not need to decide that question because the 
University of Utah had no clearly stated regulations in place.136 
Rather than relying on clearly stated time, place, and manner reg­
ulations, the University of Utah administration had simply “con­
cluded that it would be in the best interests of the university to 
require [removal of the shanties].”136
The court emphasized the deficiencies of that approach. Valid 
regulation of protected speech must be clearly stated and narrowly 
drawn.137 In addition, the regulations must be “ [f]ormally drawn 
. . . to insure that restrictions on free speech are content-neu­
tral.”138 In two footnotes, Judge Anderson noted the tension be­
tween limiting official discretion in regulating speech through time, 
place, and manner regulations, and the competing desire of univer­
sities to keep “their campuses as rule-free as possible.”139 It seems 
that first amendment values may be better protected by the pres­
ence of rules rather than by their absence. Without rules, it would 
be difficult to insure that a restriction on speech was content-neu­
tral. “ ‘An official who can grant or deny the right to speak accord­
ing to what he deems to be in the public interest is indistinguish­
able in all relevant respects from a censor.’ ”140
Given that official discretion is unacceptable, it follows that 
speech itself generates pressure for time, place, and manner regula­
tions. This conclusion is implicit in Judge Anderson’s opinion. 
“Situations like [the shanties case] make [the rule-free] approach 
increasingly difficult to maintain.”141 Formal regulations, once in 
place, would allow student groups to plan speech activities that 
would effectively convey their message while, at the same time, be 
“acceptable to the administration.”142
Finally, the court addressed the University of Utah’s safety 
concerns. Because these concerns had arisen from nighttime van­
1 3 4 . Id. at 1209 n.17.
135. See id. at 1210. Although the University of Utah was without formal regulations, 
“ [t]he cases cited by the university in support of its right to order the removal of the shan­
ties involved alleged violations of formally enacted regulations.” Id.
136. Id. at 1209-10.
137. See id. at 1210.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1210 nn.19-20.
140. Id. at 1210 n.19 (quoting Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1286 
(D.C. Cir. 1972)).
141. Id. at 1210 n.20. The rule-free approach, although not yet dead, has been on its 
way out since the late 1960s. See id. (citing Wilson, Campus Freedom and Order, 45 Den. 
L.J. 502, 507 (1968)).
142. Id. at 1210.
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dalism and violence, the protestors were ordered by the Court to 
take the shanties down at night, pending the University’s develop­
ment of formal regulations.143 While acknowledging the importance 
of the University of Utah’s concerns, Judge Anderson expressly 
noted that “the free speech interests of the students do not appear 
to be furthered by nighttime display,” so that the burden of re­
moving the shanties at night was merely “incidental”144 to the free 
speech interest.
A superficial reading of Clark v. Community for Creative 
Nonviolence145 and University of Utah Students Against 
Apartheid v. Peterson suggests that the University of Utah might 
have successfully defended a “formally drawn” regulation banning 
shanties. If such a regulation exists, a court could more easily mini­
mize the probability that a regulation was directed at the suppres­
sion of free expression, while more easily maximizing the weight of 
the regulator’s aesthetic or functional concerns than if no formal 
regulations were present. In Clark, the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court’s deci­
sion permitting sleep, as symbolic speech, to be part of a protest in 
Lafayette Park.146 The National Park Service, which administered 
the park, then clarified its regulations to forbid sleeping in the 
park, and the United States Supreme Court upheld the revised 
regulations.147
In Clark, the government relied on aesthetic concerns and its 
interest in physical preservation of public property: “maintaining 
the parks in the heart of our Capital in an attractive and intact 
condition.”148 The government agreed that “ [t]o permit camping 
. . . would be totally inimical to [this] purpose.”149 The University 
of Utah, in University of Utah Students Against Apartheid, cited 
unwritten aesthetic concerns, as well as unwritten concerns of 
“overall cost, difficulty and expense in obtaining liability insur­
ance, risk of physical harm, [and] potential university liability.”160 
But Judge Anderson correctly concluded that, “ [h]owever substan­
143. See id. at 1211. '
144. Id.
145. 468 U.S. 288 (1984); see also supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discuss­
ing Clark).
146. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 292.
147. See id. at 299.
148. Id. at 296.
149. Id.
150. University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 
1211 (D. Utah 1986).
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tial these interests are, they cannot be used in their present form 
to circumscribe the students’ speech interests.”151 The court then 
encouraged the University of Utah to draft content-neutral regula­
tions to protect its own interests “while allowing the maximum 
possible exercise of student expression.”152
Unfortunately, a more recent case involving shanties on a uni­
versity campus appears to continue a trend of allowing the sup­
pression of symbolic speech under questionable justification, so 
long as formal regulations are in place.
B. Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O’Neil
In Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O’Neil153 (O’Neil 
III) the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a 
brief per curiam decision, upheld the University of Virginia’s re­
moval of a shanty from the south lawn of its historic Rotunda. As 
in Clark, university officials had originally been rebuffed in trial 
court, because the “Lawn Use Policy” used to justify removal of 
the shanty was found to be unconnected to the university’s aes­
thetic interest and unconstitutionally vague.154 The officials then 
amended the policy to a less vague form, clarifying the term 
“structure.”165 On relitigation, the federal district court upheld the 
amended policy and removal of the shanty.156
In O’Neil II, the district court had no difficulty, under Spence 
and University of Utah Students Against Apartheid, in finding 
that the shanty was symbolic speech.157 Then, applying Clark, Re­
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1988)[hereinafter O’Neil III].
154. See Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O’Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 338-39 
(W.D. Va. 1987)[hereinafter O’Neil I],
155. See Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O’Neil, 671 F. Supp. 1105, 1106 
(W.D. Va. 1987), aff’d, 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1988)[hereinafter O’Neil II]. The Lawn Use 
Policy as first promulgated prohibited any “structure or extended presence . . .  on the 
Lawn except for those needed in connection with official University functions.” O’Neil 1,660 
F. Supp. at 341 (quoting Final Report of the President’s Ad Hoc Committee on the Use of 
the Lawn, H.B, Sept. 24, 1986). The modified policy deleted the term “ extended presence” 
and added parenthetical language: “The term ‘structure’ includes props and displays, such 
as coffins, crates, crosses, theaters, cages, and statues; furniture, and furnishings, such as 
desks, tables (except those temporarily used by participant in the ceremonies or by Univer­
sity officials for the conduct of the ceremonies), bookcases, and cabinets; shelters, such as 
tents, boxes, shanties and other enclosures; and other similar physical structures.” O’Neil II, 
671 F. Supp. at 1109 (quoting University Policy on Use of the Lawn, 1I.B, as amended, May
15, 1987).
156. See O’Neil II, 671 F. Supp. at 1108.
157. See id. at 1106.
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gan v. Time, Inc.,168 and O’Brien,109 the court found that the 
amended Lawn Use Policy was sufficiently content-neutral and 
narrowly tailored, and left open ample alternative channels of com­
munication to justify the shanty’s removal.160
As for the aesthetic interest pursued by the University of Vir­
ginia, the O’Neil II court noted, “ [regulations of speech based on 
aesthetic concerns alone have been found constitutional.”161 The 
court apparently ignored its previous observation in Students 
Against Apartheid Coalition v. O’Neil (O’Neil I),162 that other 
cases upholding speech restrictions to protect government’s aes­
thetic interests “also served goals of ensuring public safety, pro­
tecting public resources, or maintaining presidential security.”163 
In fact, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego164 cited by the 
court in O’Neil II for the proposition that aesthetic concerns alone 
could justify speech restrictions, the United States Supreme Court 
specifically cautioned that “aesthetic judgments are necessarily 
subjective, defying objective evaluation, and for that reason must 
be carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a public ra­
tionalization of an impermissible purpose.”165 This dictum suggests 
that without the associated traffic safety interest, the city’s aes­
thetic interest might not have sustained the billboard limitation 
ordinance.166
158. 468 U.S. 641 (1984). Under Regan, a time, place, and manner restriction on 
speech “ ‘may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.’ ” Id. at 648 
(quoting Heffron v. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 
(1981)). It must, however, “ ‘serve a significant governmental interest,’ ” and “must leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Id. (quoting Hef­
fron, 452 U.S. at 648). The “ alternative channels” element was added to the O’Brien and 
Clark tests.
159. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
160. See O’Neil II, 671 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
161. Id. at 1107 (citing White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518 
(D.C. Cir. 1984); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)).
162. 660 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Va. 1987).
163. Id. at 338 (citing City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 802 (1984)(public safety); Clark v. Comm, for Creative Nonviolence, -468 U.S. 288, 296
(1984)(protecting public resources); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 
F.2d 1518, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (presidential security)).
164. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). -
165. Id. at 510. The Court in Metromedia based its partial affirmance of a municipal 
billboard restriction on the city’s traffic safety interests in addition to aesthetic interests. 
See id. at 508-09.
166. Indeed, with respect to political messages, the Metromedia billboard ordinance 
failed. In prohibiting political billboards altogether, the city had impermissibly trod upon 
core first amendment values. The Court, however, upheld the ordinance with respect to
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Despite the fact that aesthetic interests were the only interests 
asserted by the University of Virginia in support of its removal of 
the shanty,167 the district court, and the Fourth Circuit upheld the 
shanty ban. This result is troublesome because it permits symbolic 
speech restrictions solely for aesthetic reasons. The lesson of Co­
hen v. California168—that speech cannot be banned simply because 
some find it unpleasant— appears to have been eroded or lost.
Elevation of aesthetic interests to justify suppression of speech 
has been justly criticized.169 The inadvisability of such a policy was 
perhaps best summarized by Justice Harlan’s observation in Co­
hen, that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”170 In the O’Neil 
cases, the University of Virginia’s aesthetic interests, though 
clearly less compelling than the safety and liability concerns of the 
University of Utah in University of Utah Students Against 
Apartheid, were held sufficient to justify an infringement of speech 
simply by virtue of being addressed in written regulations.171
The O’Neil cases also failed to consider the nature of the fo­
rum involved. The vital distinction between Clark and University 
of Utah Students Against Apartheid is not the existence or lack of 
formal regulations, but rather the paramount role of speech at the 
core of a university’s reason for being. A park, although the most 
traditional public forum, has many functions. It meets many non­
speech needs such as recreation. The sole purpose of the university 
is its educational role, however variously manifested in arts, hu­
manities, and science. Developing an awareness of critical political 
and social issues, whether in the classroom or through student-or­
ganized activities and protests, is a vital part of the university’s 
role in educating citizens. Speech in its many forms is central to
commercial messages. See id. at 513. This was due, in part, to the reduced first amendment 
protection given to commercial speech. See id.
167. See O’Neil I, 660 F. Supp. at 338. The parties stipulated that the shanties had 
done no physical damage to university property. See id. at 336. Nor was interference with 
traffic or class disruption mentioned in any of the O’Neil cases.
168. 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing 
Cohen).
169. See Quadres, supra note 54.
170. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
171. A final irony is that the court in O’Neil II, in addressing the University of Vir­
ginia’s aesthetic interest, stressed that “ [t]he Rotunda is part of the historic lawn area, orig­
inally designed by Thomas Jefferson.” O’Neil II, 671 F. Supp. 1105, 1106 (W .D . Va. 1987), 
aff’d, 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1988). One wonders whether Jefferson, a proponent of individ­
ual liberty who once wrote, “ I hold it that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing,” 
would share the university’s distress at the presence of shanties near the Rotunda. Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787), reprinted in T h om as  J efferson .- 
W r itin g s  882 (M. Peterson ed. 1984).
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this role. Accordingly, limitations on speech in the university set­
ting, no matter how “formal,” should be strictly scrutinized pursu­
ant to Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ As­
sociation.172 Such limitations should be upheld only upon a 
showing of powerful, if not compelling, government interests. Aes­
thetic interests alone simply do not rise to this level.
The existence of an alternative forum, as with aesthetic inter­
ests, does not necessarily justify a restriction on speech. While 
such a consideration may be relevant, it should not be determina­
tive.173 The alternative forum argument, like the aesthetic interest 
argument, was given too much weight in the O’Neil cases.174
Relegating a speaker to an alternative forum may deprive that 
speaker not only of the most effective means of delivering the mes­
sage, but also of the intended audience. In Dr. Martin Luther King 
Jr. Movement, Inc., v. City of Chicago,175 following the denial of a 
parade permit to plaintiff, the city suggested several alternative 
routes and gathering places. The court noted that the forum re­
quested by plaintiffs was one where they believed there was an au­
dience to which they could effectively express their views: “The 
audience [at the city’s alternative site] would be Negroes, people 
who needed no persuasion to the views plaintiffs had concerning 
events near [the requested forum].”176 The alternate route, then, 
had the effect of depriving plaintiffs of their first amendment 
rights.177
The shanty situation is similar. If the speakers are denied 
their choice of forum and are therefore driven into a lecture hall, 
then their audience will likely consist only of those already aware
172. 460 U.S. 37 (1983); see also supra notes 80-86, 88-89 and accompanying text (dis­
cussing Perry).
173. See Cass, supra note 71, at 1323. Although relevant, the alternative forum is just 
one of many considerations for a court. “ If a court considers alternative speech forums, it 
also must take account of the factors that make a given forum more or less suited to thei 
speech involved.” Id.
174. The district court in O’Neil II noted that the University of Virginia’s amended 
Lawn Use Policy “restricts structures from only a small section of the historic area, namely 
the south side of the Rotunda.” O’Neil II, 671 F. Supp. at 1107. Additionally, the court 
found that “ the new policy does not prohibit demonstrations, sit-ins, marches, hand-held 
signs or other forms of protest” in the contested area. Id. “While the alternatives may not 
be plaintiffs’ first choice of expression, ‘the First Amendment does not guarantee the right 
to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.’ ” 
Id. (quoting Heffron v. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 
(1981)).
175. 419 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. 111. 1976).
176. Id. at 674. '
177. See id.
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of the apartheid issue; the speakers will be reduced to preaching to 
the choir.
Indeed, the O’Neil protestors erected their shanty near the 
Rotunda for the express purpose of bringing their divestment plea 
to the attention of the University of Virginia’s Board of Visitors, 
the University’s policymaking body which meets quarterly in the 
Rotunda.178 In removing the shanty from that area, the University 
of Virginia distanced the protestors from their intended audience. 
The amended Lawn Use Policy was found “not [to] prohibit dem­
onstrations, sit-ins, marches, hand-held signs or other forms of 
protest” in the Rotunda area.179 But the prohibition of shanties 
denied the protestors the more powerful impact of deliberately 
ugly structures, “dramatizing the squalid living conditions of black 
South Africans . . .  to make explicit the contrast between those 
conditions and the beauty of the Rotunda.”180
Professor Tribe has argued that the relationship between the 
forum and the message may require opening otherwise nonpublic 
forums. Using hospitals and welfare departments as examples, he 
asks, “Where else could cancer patients be persuaded to appeal for 
the legalization of laetrile but at a hospital? Where else could wel­
fare recipients be urged to protest bureaucratic neglect but at a 
welfare office?”181 Similarly, where else could college students pro­
test their university’s investment policy but on their campus? 
Tribe answered his questions by rejecting as implausible any claim 
of incompatibility and then concluded that “the bare possibility of 
alternative ways to communicate the same message should not suf­
fice to defeat the first amendment claim.”182
As with aesthetic interests, the alternative forum claim is a 
weak justification for speech restrictions, especially when the 
speech occurs on a university campus— a forum dedicated to the 
exchange of ideas. Absent disruption of classroom education or 
university-sponsored activities, or actual physical damage to uni­
178. See O'Neil I, 660 F. Supp. 333, 336 (W.D. Va. 1987).
179. O'Neil II, 671 F. Supp. at 1107.
180. O’Neil I, 660 F. Supp. at 336. Nor can the possibility of an “impermissible pur­
pose” be ruled out. The protestors in O’Neil I had erected shanties in the Rotunda area on 
several prior occasions. See O'Neil I, 660 F. Supp. at 336. Were the Board of Visitors and 
University of Virginia administrators truly concerned primarily with the aesthetic appear­
ance of the area, or were they in fact feeling uncomfortable at the students’ persistent de­
mand for divestment in the face of their continued inaction? If the latter were the case, the 
shanty removal was motivated by the very effectiveness of their message.
181. L. T ribe , A m erican  C on stitutio nal  L aw  § 12-21, at 691 (1978).
182. Id. § 12-21, at 691-92.
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versity property, the exercise of first amendment rights on campus 
should be encouraged, not restricted.
V. R egulation of Shanties and Other  F orms of Symbolic
Speech
The right of a speaker is not absolute, even if the speaker’s sym­
bol is found to be entitled to first amendment protection and lo­
cated in a public forum. The state, or in the shanty case, the uni­
versity, still has the right to establish reasonable regulations 
governing the speech. Such regulations should recognize that free 
speech, especially political speech, must be encouraged, even at 
some cost.
A. Time, Place, and Manner Regulations
Speech, whether symbolic or verbal, may be constitutionally 
regulated through time, place, and manner restrictions.183 A time, 
place, and manner restriction must meet at least three require­
ments, as provided in Regan v. Time, Inc?Bi The regulations 
“ ‘may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of 
the speech,’ ” must “ ‘serve a significant governmental interest,’ ” 
and must “ ‘leave open alternative channels for communication of 
the information.’ ”185
This article proposes that a four-part test, such as that articu­
lated in City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council,166 is 
more appropriate. In Watseka, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit interpreted United States Supreme Court 
precedent to demand a fourth requirement: the regulation must be 
“narrowly tailored to serve the governmental objective.”187 This 
fourth element is found both in Clark v. Community for Creative
183. Time, place, and manner, as a constitutional standard for regulating speech, is of 
a relatively recent vintage, as is use of the first amendment to protect speech. But the words 
themselves date back 200 years, to the Constitution. “The Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed.” U.S. C onst , art. 1, 
§ 4, cl. 1.
184. 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
185. Id. at 648 (quoting Heffron v. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 
452 U.S. 640, 648-49 (1981)).
186. 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986), aff’d without opinion, 479 U.S. 1048 (1987). At 
issue in Watseka was an ordinance regulating, and severely limiting, the hours of permissi­
ble door-to-door solicitation.
187. Id. at 1552; see also Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 
1050,1056 (2d Cir. 1983)(insurance requirement imposed on demonstrators not least restric­
tive means of serving state’s legitimate interest in protecting itself from liability).
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Non-Violence188 and in the Perry standards for speech regulation 
in a public forum.189 The United States Supreme Court affirmed 
the Watseka court without opinion.190
The Watseka opinion is most significant for its analysis of the 
“narrowly tailored” test. According to the Seventh Circuit, “nar­
rowly tailored” means that a less restrictive alternative to the regu­
lation at issue must be inadequate to meet the governmental 
need.191 The government must “show both that there is a signifi­
cant relationship between the regulation and the governmental in­
terest, and that less restrictive alternatives are inadequate to pro­
tect the governmental interest.”192 The narrowly tailored test 
refines the O’Brien requirement that restrictions on first amend­
ment freedoms be “no greater than is essential” to further the gov­
ernment’s interest.193 The “significant relationship” part of the test 
requires that the government interest actually be furthered by the 
regulation. If the government’s interest is not likely to be signifi­
cantly advanced by the regulation, then its value to the govern­
ment is outweighed by the restriction on speech rights, and the 
regulation should fall.184
B. Insurance Requirements
A current trend in time, place, and manner regulations is to 
impose an insurance requirement on the speaker.196 Such a re­
quirement is often in addition to other regulations and might even 
go so far as to silence a speaker. The University of Washington has 
the following insurance requirement:
Permission to a nonuniversity organization or to a registered or 
official student organization for the use of university facilities is 
granted with the express understanding and condition that such or­
188. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984).
189. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1984); see 
also supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing Perry standards).
190. See City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 479 U.S. 1048 (1987).
191. See Watseka, 796 F.2d at 1554.
192. Id, (citation omitted).
193. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
194. The application of this part of the test probably would have changed the outcome 
in O’Brien. Maintaining possession of one’s draft card could in no way significantly aid the 
Selective Service in identifying and contacting its registrants.
195. See Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Market­
place of Ideas, 74 G eo . L.J. 257, 258 (1985). “ [W]ith increasing frequency, municipalities 
from Berkeley to New York to Skokie have been requiring political organizers . . .  to obtain
insurance, sign hold-harmless agreements, pay police and other public service fees, and post 
cleanup deposits, in addition to paying traditional permit application fees.” Id. '
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ganization assumes full responsibility for any loss, damage or claims 
arising out of such use.
When the event involves physical activity, or otherwise will in­
crease the risk of bodily injury above the level inherent in the facili­
ties to be used, proof of appropriate liability insurance coverage with 
limits of at least $1,000,000 per occurrence must be provided to the 
university’s office of risk management before approval for the re­
quested use will be granted.196
Washington had shanties, but they were removed after six to eight 
weeks without any action on the part of the University.197
The University of Utah did not attempt to make the Students 
Against Apartheid purchase liability insurance. Nevertheless, the 
University relied in part on liability concerns in their effort to re­
move the shanties, claiming that “due to the nature of the shanties 
and the inherent risk associated therewith, liability coverage . . . 
will be cancelled with respect to any liability arising out of the 
shanties. Optional liability insurance is not available at reasonable 
cost to the University.”198 The University also claimed to be “at 
risk with respect to liability suits brought by third persons due to 
any injury caused in connection with the shanties.”199
Potential liability, while a valid concern of government or an 
institution, does not necessarily justify suppressing the symbols of 
speech, whether verbal or nonverbal. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Eastern Connecticut Citizens 
Action Group v. Powers,200 considered the Connecticut Depart­
ment of Transportation’s attempt to impose an insurance require­
ment on an organization seeking to march against a proposed free­
way. The court stated that “ [w]hile the state has a legitimate 
interest in protecting itself from liability for injuries associated 
with the use of its property, we are not persuaded that the insur­
ance requirement represents the least restrictive means of serving 
that interest.”201 The court noted the availability of criminal sanc­
tions to deal with trespass or vandalism and placed the burden on 
the state to demonstrate that “those carefully-crafted remedies
196. W ash . A d m in . C ode  § 478-136-060(2)(1983).
197. See Letter from Elsa Kircher Cole, Assistant Attorney General, to Edwin 
Firmage (Nov. 10, 1986).
198. Defendants’ Memorandum at 3, University of Utah Students Against Apartheid 
v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Utah 1986) (No. 86C-06884).
199. Id.
200. 723 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter ECCAG].
201. Id. at 1056.
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[were] unavailing.”202
It is also well established that officials must protect a speaker 
against a hostile audience.203 To do otherwise would be to allow 
hostile groups or individuals, through violence or the simple threat 
of violence, to act as censors. Additionally, it makes little sense to 
single speech out for an insurance requirement when other activi­
ties, quite likely more risky to participants or to others, are not 
subjected to such treatment:
[IJndividual pedestrians are not forced to pay for insurance against 
street crimes, businesses need not post insurance against business 
crimes or torts, and police officers are not required to buy insurance 
for police misconduct. Likewise, these groups are not required to 
buy insurance for any possible municipal liability derived from their 
misbehavior. Only large public associations are subjected to this re­
quirement, even though there is no evidence that the risk of crime 
or intentional torts is statistically greater in these circumstances.204
Universities administer research hospitals and transplant human 
organs, conduct nuclear research, store and dispose of fissionable 
materials, use toxic chemicals, and use— even create— biological or­
ganisms. Insurance requirements, carried to extremes, could pre­
clude each of those activities. Speech is central to the existence of 
the university; it must not be stifled with extraordinary risk insur­
ance costs.
As it did early in the development of the public forum law 
with permit requirements,206 the United States Supreme Court 
should put strict limits on the imposition of insurance require­
ments for use of public forums. At least one lower court has al­
ready taken this step. The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, in Collin v. O’Malley,206 invalidated 
an insurance requirement imposed on the National Socialist (Nazi)
202. Id. at 1057. The court, however, left open the possibility of a “reasonably ap­
plied” insurance requirement, noting that such requirement “must be carefully scrutinized.” 
Id.
203. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
204. Neisser, supra note 195, at 302. Neisser, however, advocates the requirement of 
insurance for the negligent acts of speakers. Such premiums presumably would be much 
lower than those for intentional acts. See id. at 305.
205. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)(permit requirements 
must not “deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly”); Schneider v. State, 308 
U.S. 147,160 (1939) (permit regulations “may not abridge the individual liberties secured by 
the Constitution”); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939)(ordinance may not allow local 
officials to deny parade permit on mere opinion that disruption might occur).
206. No. 76 C 2024 (N.D. 111. July 29, 1977), motion for stay denied, 452 F. Supp. 577 
(N.D. 111. 1978).
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Party of America. Officials had required plaintiffs to purchase lia­
bility coverage of $100,000/$300,000 and property damage coverage 
of $50,000.207 Notwithstanding likely disruption from the demon­
stration, the court struck down the requirement “as an unreasona­
ble restraint on First Amendment rights.”208 If such a requirement 
was unreasonable for the American Nazi party, it is certainly un­
reasonable for those speaking through a silent symbol and seeking 
to avoid rather than create confrontation.
C. Shanties Across America
From coast to coast college campuses have seen shanties; at 
least thirty colleges or universities have had shanties.209 Generally, 
shanty demonstrations have been nondisruptive and costs to uni­
versities hosting the shanties have been minimal.210 The exceptions 
to those generalizations, of course, have received much more 
publicity.211
Most universities experiencing shanties have recognized that 
they were intended as speech and attempted to work with the stu­
dents associated with the shanties. These universities thus fulfilled 
their role in fostering the free exchange of ideas.
Indiana University exemplifies the tolerant, and even support­
ive, approach. “Universities in our civilization are places where dis­
207. See id.
208. ECCAG, 723 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1983)(discussing Collin v. O’Malley, No. 76 
C 2024 (N.D. 111. July 29, 1987), motion for stay denied, 452 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. 111. 1978)).
209. Information on shanties on campuses other than the Universities of Utah and 
Virginia derives from general circulation media and a questionnaire sent by the authors of 
this Article to universities across the country. One hundred thirty-four universities re­
sponded. Institutions indicating that they have had shanties were Boston University, Bran- 
deis University (Waltham, Massachusetts), Brown University (Providence, Rhode Island), 
Bucknell University (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania), Eastern Illinois University, Harvard Uni­
versity, Indiana University, Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, Maryland), Keene State 
College (New Hampshire), Milsaps College (Jackson, Mississippi), Oberlin College (Oberlin, 
Ohio), Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University, Plymouth State College (New 
Hampshire), Princeton University, Syracuse University (tents), University of Houston, Uni­
versity of Iowa, University of Kansas, University of Michigan, University of New Hamp­
shire, University of North Carolina, University of Pennsylvania, University of South Caro­
lina, University of South Florida, University of Southern California, University of Virginia, 
University of Washington and Washington University (St. Louis).
210. Of 22 universities responding to the authors’ questionnaire item regarding the 
costs of shanties, six reported they had no data, 13 reported minimal or no costs, and only 
two reported costs in excess of $1,000. The latter two reported costs of over $5,000 and over 
$20,000. Among the “minimal cost” responses, the most common expenses were cleanup and 
lawn reseeding.
211. Costs to the University of Utah included $5,000 for security and at least $20,000 
for the shanties litigation. See supra note 101.
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senting and controversial views can be aired and discussed. This 
exchange of views is not merely something to be tolerated; it is a 
source of diversity and strength for our society as a whole.”212 
Oberlin College worked with its shanty builders to minimize 
confrontation and disruption. Students were asked to move the 
shanties when the space was needed for commencement. The stu­
dents did not move them. Rather than destroying the structures, 
the administration simply had its workers move them.213
Some form of regulation will often prove essential, if only to 
deal with the situation of multiple speakers attempting to use a 
single forum simultaneously.214 The University of Iowa focuses on 
time, place, and manner considerations rather than on the content 
of the speech: “In dealing with student expressions of dissent, the 
central question is one of time, manner and place. There is no 
question about the worthiness of the views expressed or the right 
to express the views. Rather, it is the form and circumstances of 
expression which is occasionally the issue.”216
Time, place, and manner restraints need not be incompatible 
with free speech. Indiana University decided to use regulation not 
to restrict access, but to open a forum.216 The University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign emphasizes both free speech and regulation
212. University of Indiana Assembly Ground Committee, Report to Dean M.V.W. 
Gordon (Sept. 26, 1986).
213. See Letter from George H. Langeler, Dean of Students of Oberlin College, to 
Edwin B. Firmage (Oct. 9, 1986). Oberlin experienced more difficulty with two other in­
stances of symbolic speech. After the shanties had been erected, a different group of stu­
dents erected a “Berlin Wall.” Another group of students destroyed the wall. Students also 
disrupted, and prevented, a 21 gun salute planned in conjunction with a Ronald Reagan 
Appreciation day. Additionally, the administration cancelled a showing of the film, The 
Gods Must Be Crazy (C.A.T. Film 1984), because it feared disruption after a student group 
had asked that it be cancelled because it was racist and demeaning to blacks. See id.
Dean Langeler, responding to those incidents of intolerance, said, “I, on the one hand, 
will protect the right of anyone to speak his or her thoughts in accordance with the Consti­
tution and by the same token take action against those who violate the rights of others to 
freely express themselves in accordance with the Constitution.” George H. Langeler, Re­
marks at the Forum on Civil Liberties, Oberlin College (Sept. 7, 1986).
214. The classic example is that of two parades attempting to march on the same 
street at the same time. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
215. Letter from Julia A. Mears, Assistant to the President of University of Iowa, to 
Edwin B. Firmage (Dec. 3, 1986).
216. “The Board of Trustees has designated an area on Dunn Meadow immediately 
north of the Memorial Union as the Indiana University Assembly Ground. Here, members 
of the University Community may express themselves freely on all subjects, within the lim­
its of applicable laws and regulations, with or without advance notice.” Student Shanties 
Protest Apartheid, Indiana Daily Student, Apr. 14,1986, at 1, col. 1 (citing Indiana Univer­
sity campus regulations).
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of that speech. The university had shanties three times in the 
spring of 1986, with permits granted each time. Once the univer­
sity granted a permit even though the demonstrators had not re­
quested one, “to ensure that no university regulations were vio­
lated.”217 The shanties were allowed to remain for about one week 
each time. The first and the third time, the students removed the 
shanties themselves; the University removed the shanties on expi­
ration of the permit the second time. The administration, in dis­
cussing the shanties, did not question the right of the speakers to 
erect the structures. Rather, discussion focused on the size of the 
shantytown and a limit on its duration.218 The University of Illi­
nois at Urbana-Champaign found itself faced with a problem often 
troublesome to the United States Supreme Court: where to strike 
the balance between freedom of expression and control of a forum. 
“Our campus has a history in the past two decades of respecting 
the right of free speech while vigorously seeking to control time, 
place, and manner.”219 The University of Illinois seems to have 
made an informed attempt to find that balance. Rather than 
choosing a confrontational approach, the Chancellor of the Univer­
sity of Illinois spoke at the shantytown, commending the protes­
tors and asking their cooperation.220
Washington University, a private school in St. Louis, Missouri, 
also worked with its shanty builders. The result was six weeks of 
shanties on campus, with minimal costs to the university.221 The 
students initially did not apply for a permit. After the shanties 
were constructed, the administration suggested to the builders that 
they obtain a permit. The students then applied for, and received, 
the appropriate permit. Washington University encountered a situ­
ation often cited as a justification for permit require­
ments— conflicting uses of a particular space. The shanty builders 
had to move their shanties twice, once for a concert, and again for 
commencement. The moves were not to hide the shanties, but sim­
ply because the space was needed for other previously scheduled 
activities. Students abandoned the shanty after commencement
217. Letter from Stanley R. Levy, Vice Chancellor of University of Illinois at Urbana- 




221. See Letter from Karen Holm, Associate General Counsel for Washington Univer­
sity, to Edwin B. Firmage (Dec. 17, 1986).
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and university workers then removed it.222
One common fear of speech in general, and nonverbal sym­
bolic speech in particular, is cost. Universities experiencing shan­
ties reported costs ranging from zero to over $20,000.223 Harvard 
reported a cost of at least $20,000.224 The University of Michigan, 
on the other hand, said that it dealt with its shanties “calmly,” and 
that the shanties had not cost the university any money.226
D. University of Utah Speech Regulations
The University of Utah responded to the University of Utah 
Students Against Apartheid decision by drafting a new campus 
speech policy. That policy may furnish guidance to other college 
and university administrators confronted with symbolic speech. It 
was drafted with the awareness that while regulation may be per­
missible, tolerance and protection of speech rights are essential in 
a university setting.
The preamble to the University of Utah’s new time, place, and 
manner regulations (“Speech Policies”) states: “It is the purpose of 
these regulations to protect and enhance the free exchange of ideas 
in the University and on the University campus.”226 The new regu­
lations, promulgated by the University of Utah Speech Committee 
(“Flynn Committee”),227 appear to represent a significant step to­
ward that end; the University of Utah recognizes that it must not 
only permit speech but also must protect speech from censorship, 
and “from those committed to interference with a speaker’s pres­
entation through acts of disruption.”228
Giving substance to the desire to “protect and enhance the 
free exchange of ideas,” the Speech Policies explicitly permit the 
use of structures such as shanties to convey a message. “Members
222. See id.
223. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
224. See Letter from Daniel Steiner, Vice President and General Counsel for Harvard 
University, to Edwin B. Firmage (Oct. 27, 1986).
225. Letter from Roderick K. Dane, General Counsel for University of Michigan, to 
Edwin B. Firmage (Oct. 10, 1986).
226. University Regulations, Ch. IX, University Speech Policies, Preamble and State­
ment of Policy (May 15, 1987)[hereinafter Speech Policies],
227. The University of Utah Speech Committee soon became known as the Flynn 
Committee. Chairing the committee was John J. Flynn, Hugh B. Brown Professor of Law at 
the University of Utah College of Law. The committee included students, university admin­
istrators, law and communications faculty, practicing attorneys, and a representative of the 
media. It also included one of the individual plaintiffs in University of Utah Students 
Against Apartheid, Mark Nelson.
228. Speech Policies, Preamble and Statement of Policy.
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of the University community and their organizations may erect 
structures on campus to express their views or opinions. Such 
structures may deal with any subject matter including, but not 
limited to, expressions of positions and ideas on social or political 
topics.”229
Recognizing that excessive discretion is not acceptable, the 
regulations stipulate that the University “shall” grant a permit to 
erect a structure:
(1) if the intended structure and uses made of it will not constitute 
an unreasonable safety hazard and will not impede the normal func­
tions of the University;
(2) the structure does not block or impede entry to any building or 
interfere with normal pedestrian or-vehicular traffic; and
(3) the proposed location of the structure does not inflict unreasona­
ble damage upon landscaping like flower gardens and shrubs.230
The first two tests address protection of classroom-based edu­
cation and other university-sponsored functions. The third test by 
implication limits “aesthetic” concerns to actual physical damage 
to university property. These threshold permit requirements are 
thus content-neutral and limited to protecting university interests 
whose substantial nature cannot be doubted.
In addition, the Speech Policies provide for renewal of a per­
mit. Assuming that the speaker still meets the requirements, the 
permit “shall” be renewed.231 The real limitation comes from the 
academic calendar: “ [I]n no case shall a renewal period extend be­
yond the end of the academic quarter.”232
Obtaining a permit to use expressive structures subjects the 
speakers to additional time, place, and manner requirements. The 
first three requirements of the permit are simply administrative. 
The permit application must identify (1) the speaker, (2) the pro­
posed location and design of the structure, and (3) the length of 
time, with a thirty-day maximum, that the permit will be in
229. Id. tit. IV, § 3(A)(1). The same section defines “structure” as “any object (other 
than objects such as handbills, signs, notices and posters, arm bands or personal attire) used 
in the process of expressing views or opinions including, but not limited to, lawn signs, ta­
bles (and other structures used to display materials), booths, buildings, billboards, banners, 
and similar displays.” Id. tit. IV, § 3(A)(2). The final regulations reflect a significant change 
from earlier drafts which included shanties in the definition of “structure.” Also omitted 
were flags and crosses. See Speech Policies, Draft 8 (Jan. 17, 1987).
230. Speech Policies, tit. IV, § 3(B)(3).
231. See id. tit. IV, § 3(B)(4).
232. Id.
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effect.233 .
Two further requirements are more important, as they address 
concerns of the university which might be used to justify denying a 
speaker access to a forum. First, the permit application must in­
clude “an agreement to . . . pay for any damage the structure may 
cause to the site upon which it is erected.”234 Second, the applica­
tion must include “an agreement to hold the University harmless 
for any assessed damages or liabilities caused by the structure 
itself.”236
The “agreement to pay” and “hold harmless” requirements 
are repeated in a section entitled “Responsibility for Content and 
Safety of Structures.”236 That section poses potential problems if 
the University interprets it to justify imposing insurance or bond­
ing requirements on speakers. If simply interpreted as written, 
however, the section meets the Watseka requirements:237 it is con­
tent-neutral, serving the substantial University interest in the 
physical integrity of its grounds; it leaves open all communicative 
channels that do not cause physical harm; and it is narrowly tai­
lored, limiting the speakers’ liability to that actually caused “by 
the structure itself,” and relieving them from liability for the law­
less acts of those opposing the structures or their message.
The “hold harmless” requirement also has a content-based 
component: “By erecting any structure on campus, the member or 
members of the University community agrees to hold the Univer­
sity harmless for any assessed damages or liabilities . . . caused by 
libel or slander in the message it conveys.”238 By law, the content- 
based italicized portion, applying to political speech in a public fo­
rum, must be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
233. See id. tit. IV, § 3(B)(2). The Speech Policies also require “an agreement to re­
move the structure upon expiration of the permit.” Id.
234. Id. tit. IV, § 3(B)(2). •
235. Id. The section also includes a staffing requirement. “In the case of structures 
. . . other than structures that are lawn signs, posters, billboards, banners and similar self- 
explanatory structures, the Scheduling Director shall require that the structure be regularly 
staffed during daytime school hours as a condition of issuing the permit and renewing the 
permit.” Id. This requirement serves as a “mettle” test, “so that individuals or organizations 
would not just perpetually keep structures up without any on-going responsibility for them 
and the message they were attempting to convey.” Flynn Committee, Distribution to Com­
mittee Members, Document 3 (Jan. 20, 1987).
236. Speech Policies, tit. IV, § 3(D).
237. See City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir.
1986); see also supra notes 186-92 and accompanying text (discussing Watseka).
238. Speech Policies, tit. IV, § 3(D) (emphasis added).
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. . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”239 It appears that the 
“hold harmless requirement satisfies this test: the University’s in­
terest in avoiding lawsuits unrelated to its own actions is certainly 
compelling. More importantly, the requirement is narrowly drawn 
in that it leaves the University of Utah out of the business of cen­
soring the message for possible defamation; that judgment is left to 
the speakers. The University of Utah is allowing use of its forum to 
express political views, while ensuring that it will neither endorse 
nor defend defamatory messages.240
The University of Utah’s Speech Policies are also significant 
for their title: “University Speech Policies.”  Those wishing to exer­
cise their speech rights on the campus need not hunt for, or be 
surprised by, seemingly nonspeech-related policies such as the 
“Lawn Use Policy” at issue in the O’Neil cases. The University 
Policies are thus not only formally drawn but serve an important 
notice function by being clearly identifiable.
VI. C o n c lu s io n
Nonverbal symbolic speech has an honorable history in first 
amendment jurisprudence. Its use implicates certain government 
interests. These interests, however, do not justify limiting symbolic 
speech unless they are substantial and unrelated to the symbol’s 
message, and interfere with speech no more than necessary to fur­
ther the government interest. Concerns about offensiveness and 
aesthetics, standing alone, are inadequate to justify restricting 
symbolic political speech. As with verbal speech, symbolic speech 
should receive strict protection when it deals with political issues. 
Too often we simply assume words are ultimate reality. Words, af­
ter all, are symbols of a deeper inarticulate reality. Words and non­
verbal entities or activities equally are symbols of such ultimate 
meaning.
State universities are public forums limited only by the neces­
sities of their function as educational institutions. The university’s 
educational function must of course be protected against excessive 
interference by its use as a public forum. Freedom of expression,
239. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see 
also supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing Perry); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 
312, 321 (1988)(reaffirming Perry doctrine).
240. See Speech Policies. The Preamble and Statement of Policy further buttresses 
the University’s intent to not serve as a shield for defamatory speech: “By virtue of regulat­
ing the exercise of free speech on the campus, the University does not sponsor or sanction 
the messages being stated . . . unless expressly stated otherwise.” Id.
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however, is a central component of the university’s educational 
function, and restrictions on this freedom in the university setting 
must accordingly be strictly scrutinized.
Balancing techniques are appropriate to protect both state in­
terests and speech. Such balancing must not be done through offi­
cial discretion, but through formally drawn, carefully conceived 
regulation. When balancing potentially competing interests, it is 
important to limit the weight given to the state’s aesthetic or other 
subjective interests. At the same time, the. effectiveness of symbolic 
speech and the nature of the forum in which such speech occurs 
must be carefully considered. The efforts of the University of Utah 
to protect the integrity of its educational function and the attrac­
tiveness of its grounds through its Speech Policies provide a model 
for such balancing.
The shanties aroused emotions and engaged intellect. Like sit- 
ins, burning draft cards, and tea in Boston Harbor, they called on 
us to examine the relationship between ethics and politics, rhetoric 
and actions. And they did so with an empowering directness that 
threatened the established order.
The dialogue stimulated by shanties and other provocative 
forms of speech is the ingredient essential to change, renewal, and 
survival. The impact of shanties arguably contributed to the free­
ing of Nelson Mandela as the 1990 decade opened. Apartheid may 
be falling. But the coming decade will present our nation 
—indeed, the world—with further challenges to the human im­
pulse of growth and survival. A multitude of critical issues will vie 
for positions at the forefront of our consciousness. At times, those 
attempting to educate the world about important issues will be 
faced with other powerful human impulses—such as complacency 
and fear of change. Precisely because it has the power to overcome 
complacency where words alone may not, nonverbal symbolic 
speech should be protected to the greatest extent possible. Pre­
cisely because our universities are valued for their contribution to 
the marketplace of ideas, robust, even provocative speech occur­
ring on our campuses should be encouraged. The task of our courts 
is to foster the bringing of social and political issues to our atten­
tion, and view with suspicion any efforts to limit such communica­
tion. The first amendment demands no less.
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